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Abstract—Over the past few years, significant developments
were introduced within the vehicular domain. The modern
vehicle becomes a network of dozens of embedded systems which
collaborate together. While these improvements have increased
the efficiency of the vehicle, they have introduced new potential
risks. Threat modeling has gained a central role to identifying the
threats that affect different subsystems inside the vehicle. In most
cases, threat modeling was implemented either for one subsystem
or based on a specific perspective such as the external threat
surfaces only. In this work, we tried to revise the existing threat
modeling efforts in the vehicular domain. We reassembled them
and extracted their main characteristics to build a comprehensive
threat model. This general model could be used to identify the
different threats against the vehicular domain. Furthermore,
reusable attack trees could be derived from this general model.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, vehicle manufacturing has changed significantly.
These changes were reflected in the increased use of auto-
motive embedded systems and the large amount of embed-
ded software applications which were integrated within each
single vehicle. the modern vehicle may contain up to 100
microcontroller-based computers, known as electronic control
units (ECUs), and runs millions of lines of codes (LOC) [1],
[2]. Each ECU relies on a set of sensors and actuators to
serve one or more of the electrical systems or subsystems in
a vehicle. Different types of communication buses (e.g. CAN,
LAN, etc.) were used to interconnect the distributed ECUs
inside the car. The increase of connectivity within the vehicles
was a double-edged sword. On the one hand, it extended the
vehicle functionalities and capabilities, but on the other hand,
it opened the door for several cybersecurity threats and made
the vehicle a more attractive target to adversaries [3].
The safety critical nature of the vehicle imposes the adop-
tion of high-security measures when developing vehicular IT
systems. The good understanding of the security requirements,
which could be concluded from the threat modeling, is a
primary step toward contriving the sufficient security counter-
measures. Threat modeling helps to identify and address most
of the potential threats. In fact, threats identification would
likely reduce the life cycle cost of achieving security objectives
when it is considered during the design process. Furthermore,
threat modeling provides relevant information about the attack
vectors which threaten the system. Such data could be used
later as a reference during the test process to avoid the omitted
threats.
Different researchers scrutinized threat modeling in the
vehicular domain. However, most of the researches focused on
studying the potential threats partially; by looking at threats
which affect a particular sub-system, then by creating attack
vectors, and by suggesting appropriate mitigation mechanisms.
Practically, the lack of a general threat model, within the vehic-
ular domain, makes threats analysis of the different subsystems
a resource consuming task. On the other hand, it increases
the possibility of the inconsistencies between the interacting
subsystems and it causes redundancy while defining the attack
vectors.
In this work, we revised the existing vehicle-related threat
modeling efforts to develop a comprehensive threat model.
We defined the various potential attackers’ groups, nature of
the attack, potential targets and security requirements of the
vehicular domain. Then, we proposed an abstract model which
could be used to classify all conceivable attacks against the
vehicular domain. The abstract model was used as an aid to
construct general attack trees [4] which illustrate the attack
vectors that threaten a particular sub-system of the vehicle.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section II,
we reviewed the existing threat models of the vehicular domain
and reassembled them. We proposed a general model, in
section III, to identify the possible threats within the vehicle. In
Section IV, we used our general model to identify the threats
within the automated obstacle avoidance use-case. Related
work was presented in section V. Finally, we presented our
conclusion in section VI.
II. THREAT MODELING
Threat modeling is a systematic approach for describing
and classifying the security threats which affects a system.
Moreover, it provides significant information that would help
to safeguard the target subsystem against the attacks. Effective
defense against threats requires addressing all existing security
flaws in the target system and identifying threats which exploit
these vulnerabilities. In addition, it demands a good com-
prehension about the prospective attackers, their capabilities,
and their objectives. Therefore, we start exploring the threat
modeling in the vehicular domain by defining the potential
attackers’ profiles.
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A. Attacker profile
Different groups of attackers were attracted to attack the
vehicles. These groups vary from the owner of the car to
an expert hacker with sophisticated tools. Each one of these
groups could have its own motivations:
• Falsification: An attacker (who could be the owner) may
like to misrepresent the actual vehicle information such
as changing the tachograph or odograph measurements to
sell the car with false mileage reading.
• Illegal profit: An attacker could make a profit by stealing
the vehicle or by selling the attack capability to other or-
ganization. Some attacks could be driven by a commercial
competitor of the target vehicle’s vendor to sabotage their
product and gain the competition in the market.
• Insane fun and vandalism: revenge and vandalism could
motivate some attacks as the case of a dismissed em-
ployee who sought to punish his ex-company by bricking
the sold cars from this company [5].
• Research and test purposes: attacks and penetration tests
could be done by security experts or test teams. The
attacker, in this case, has benign motivations. They try
discovering the security flaws of the different components
of the vehicle before they were exploited.
• Accidental: in some circumstances, an attack could hap-
pen without any intention. such attack could occur while
upgrading the existing system or reading unawares mali-
cious data; as the case of the malfunction in vehicles GPS,
climate control and front console radio systems within
Toyota Lexus vehicles [6] .
• Overlap: sometimes, multiple motives could stand behind
a single attack.
However, motivation alone is not enough; an attacker needs
sufficient technical skills and different sets of equipment
to achieve his targets. The disparity of skills, capabilities,
technical equipment, and financial resources could be used
as indication to classify the attackers into different groups [7]:
• Unsophisticated attackers (script kiddie): attackers with
limited financial resources and insignificant knowledge
about the vehicle architecture belong to this group. Such
attackers lack the ability to use complicated tools. Regular
thieves, owners who would like to install or replace a
component within their cars, an attacker who messes up
with the highway signals for gaining some reputation are
all good examples of this group members
• Hacker: This group includes highly skilled experts who
have the adequate tools and equipment to perform the
attack. The members of this group could use their expe-
rience to get profit such as black-hat hackers. Mechanics
and security researchers belong to this group.
• Organization: these organizations have multiple members
of the above group who work together. The relatively
massive financial support enables them to obtain the
sophisticated tools and attract experts. Security research
groups could be one sample of this class.
B. Attackable objects
Attackers may focus in different parts of the vehicle com-
ponents such:
1) Data: attackers could target stored data in some ECUs;
these data could be cryptographic private keys, digital
certificates, or private vehicle and driver activities (e.g.,
location of vehicle, navigation destination, etc.). Or they
could threaten transferred wired/wireless data within the
vehicle. These data include: a) In-vehicle exchanged
data between the different components themselves and
between one component and its sensors. Spoofing the
transferred data between the on-board system and the
pressure sensors on the tires is an example of the
vulnerability of such data [8] . b) Transferred date
between the vehicle and the external world; such as V2V
communication data, V2I communication data, etc.
2) In-Vehicle Hardware: generally, attacking the hardware
infrastructure (i.e., ECUs, sensors, and OUBs) requires
physical access to the target devices. Attacking In-
Vehicle hardware could occur by replacing a device
with a malicious one, or even installing new hardware
which performs mischievously. Sometimes, the attacked
hardware may not be a part of the vehicle. It could be
3rd patty devices plugged to the vehicle, such as driver’s
mobile phone [9]. The attacker could target to degrade
the performance of the vehicle’s component or even lead
them to produce misleading results intentionally (e.g.
Volkswagen’s Emissions Scandal [10]) .
3) Surrounding infrastructure: Some attacks could target
the surrounding environment of the vehicle. A typical
example of such an attack is the modifications to the
electronic road signs such as ”Zombies Ahead”, where
an attacker figured out how to alter the text on electronic
road signs warning of Zombies attack. Even such a
ridiculous attack could create public safety issues for
the drivers on the roadway [11].
4) Software and framework: the massive amount of the
integrated software on each vehicle and the variety of
security auditing between its different vendors make
it more susceptible to attacks. the framework which
controls the ECU could be a target for various attacks;
some attackers could tamper with this framework of the
ECU to achieve superior performance [12]. Malicious
update of one application or for the framework could
open the door for the attacker to vandalize the vehicle.
C. Attack requirements
1) Physical access: Some attacks are based on the physical
access to the target vehicle. The direct access could
happen while a vehicle is parked. Then, attackers could
have a chance to attach a GPS device to track the vehicle
later or target the vehicle’s immobilizer and electronic
locks [13]. In some circumstances, taking the car to the
service station to check it could become an avenue for
physical access from attackers. In such cases, an attacker
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has full access to the vehicle, and he could get the benefit
of using existing physical interfaces to have direct access
to the internal network. On-board Diagnostic port (ODP-
II) is one physical interface which was already employed
in many attacks [3].
2) Remote access: Some other attacks does not require
physical access to the target vehicle. Attackers could
target the vehicle remotely. Such attacks take advan-
tage of the integrated wireless features of modern cars.
These features include Bluetooth, a cellular connection,
wireless tire pressure monitoring, etc. The entertainment
system is another point which could be remotely hacked.
Playing a song laced with Malware able to emit mali-
cious messages to the CAN bus [3].
3) Mixed access: direct access to the vehicle could be an
introduction to remote attacks. Indeed, some attackers,
even with rapid direct access to the vehicle, could install
some devices inside the vehicle (such as a cover USB,
malicious DVD, malicious component connected via
OBD-II port, etc.) or outside it (communication sniffing
devices). Later on, they could employ those parasitic
devices to target the vehicle remotely. Attackers may use
other people to install such devices, such as a valet who
parks the victim’s car, a mechanic at a service station
[3], etc.
D. Attack effects
We could classify attacks based on their effect:
1) Limited attack: the final target of some attacks could be
a single part of the vehicle. the effect of such attacks
will stay bounded in the attacked ECUs and not spread
anymore. The targeted system will define the jeopardy
of the attack.
2) Stepping stone attack: the attack could start by compro-
mising one component or subsystem. Later, the attacker
uses this subsystem as an attack surface to plague all
related subsystems. The same process could be repeated
for the newly infected components. Koscher et al. [3]
showed that an attacker who can control one ECU is
able to attack other connected ECUs.
E. Security Requirements
1) Authentication and Integrity: providing the integrity
within the vehicular systems is comprised of:
• Providing data integrity to safeguard against any modifi-
cation on the data during the transaction.
• Providing message source authentication to enable the
verification of the two ends of the communication.
• Providing framework and software integrity to ensure the
use of only trusted code and prevent the influence of
malware.
• Providing hardware integrity to prevent hardware fraud.
2) Privacy and Confidentiality: While providing authenti-
cation for the exchanged messages in the vehicular domain
is vital, providing confidentiality often is less important. For
example, there is no critical reason to encrypt the exchanged
messages between the different ECUs inside the vehicle.
Enforcing confidentiality for the exchanged data should not be
mainly to prevent vehicle identification detection. The ability
to identify the vehicle is feasible already by different mech-
anisms without the need to snoop the exchanged messages
such as (identify vehicle by color, number plate, etc.) The
primary goals should be preventing the leak of the driver’s
critical data (such as driver behavior, previous location). And
to guarantee that any observer is not able to link different
message, coming from the same source, efficiently. In some
scenarios, confidentiality is required; for example, leaving
the valuable stored information without any confidentiality
protection, such as encryption, may leave the whole vehicle
security at stake if an attacker is able to extract these data.
3) Availability: Availability is required especially for
safety-related applications which are integrated within the
vehicle. Such applications should be available even if it is
under attack.
III. ABSTRACT MODEL
A. Proposed model
We tried to extract the main characters of the reassembled
threat model, in section III, to create an abstract model. This
model could be adopted by the security experts to identify
and classify the majority of threats against the vehicular
systems. Such classification could reduce redundancy and
inconsistencies while applying the defense techniques against
the homogeneous threats. Also, it leads to defining the generic
attack trees.
The proposed model shown in Fig. 1 used three layers to
identify and classify the threats:
1) Target Domains: the vehicular system contains various
assets (e.g. hardware, software, data, or surrounding infrastruc-
ture). Each asset may include several hidden vulnerabilities.
A motivated attacker could target this asset by generating
the sufficient conditions to exploit one or more of these
vulnerabilities. We use these various assets as the first layer for
identifying the potential threats by defining the flaws within
each asset.
2) Requirements violation: the exploitation of an existing
vulnerability in any asset will lead to a violation in one or more
of the security requirements (i.e. Confidentiality, Integrity,
or Availability). We could further identify and classify the
potential threats based on the violated requirement.
3) Accessibility: finally, the way of accessing the vehicle
(i.e., remote, direct, or mixed access) to exploit a specific
vulnerability used as the last level for compartmentalization.
Applying this model for the whole vehicle system will
identify most of the threats. Achieving each one of these
threats will be used as a root of a general attack tree which
explains how an attacker could exploit a defined vulnerability.
Manipulating the data and disabling the hardware parts in the
vehicle are examples of such general attack trees.
These trees will turn into distinct ones gradually reflecting
the various studied subsystems. The accomplishment of one
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Fig. 1. General threat model which identifies and classifies threats and links
them to general attack trees
tree could open the door to fulfill other trees as we explained
within the stepping stone attack.
Within the context of a vehicular system, many researchers
used attack trees to illustrate the attack vectors which threaten
a particular sub-system of the vehicle. However, general attack
trees seemed to be indispensable to avoid the redundancy and
the interference between the high number of integrated sub-
systems within the vehicle. The general trees will be derived
from threats which were identified by our proposed threat
model.
B. Attack Trees
Threat analysis describes who are the potential assaulters,
what are the motivations behind an attack, and what com-
ponents he could threaten. Describing How an attack could
occur is the mission of attack trees. An attack tree is used
to explain attacks in a tree structure as shown in Fig. 2. The
root of the tree represents the essential attacker’s goal, while
the intermediate nodes of the tree (sub-goals) define different
stages of the attack. Each node in an attack tree could require
achieving all of its sub-goals. Then the sub-goals are combined
by AND branch. Or it could require achieving any one of its
sub-goals. In this case, the sub-goals are combined by OR
branch. Leafs nodes represent atomic attacks. Attack scenarios
are generated from the attack tree by traversing the tree in
a depth-first method [14]. Each attack scenario will contain
the minimum combination of leafs. The attacks chronology in
classical attack tree models was disregarded. But, in many
cases, the success of an attack depends on the subsequent
success of interrelated attack steps. Arnold et al. [15] proposed
the sequential AND- and OR-gates to handle the sequential
occurrence of attacks.
C. Review risk analysis
Attack trees were used to evaluate the security risk of
the system and calculate the probability of a successful at-
tack. This possibility depends on some aspects, proposed by
ISO/IEC 18045, such as the required time for an attack, the
Goal
Attack 1Sub-goal 1 Sub-goal 2
OR
AND
Attack 2 Attack 3 Attack 4 Attack 5
SAND
Fig. 2. Attack Tree
desired attack tools, etc. However, regarding the risk analysis
within the vehicular domain, the calculation of the probability
of potential attacks based on associating numeric values with
each level of these factors as proposed by ISO/IEC 18045
is not adequate anymore. Elapsed time, for example, has a
different effect regarding the way of carrying out the attack,
whether it is a remote attack or one with direct access to
the vehicle. Moreover, the overlap between expertise and
used tools also has a different effect; even inexpert attacker
could launch an attack by using sophisticated tools. finally,
the stepping stone attacks should be considered during the
calculation of probability of an attack. An attack could have
a low likelihood, but achieving one attack goal in a different
subsystem may increase this possibility.
IV. USE-CASE - AUTOMATED OBSTACLE AVOIDANCE
A. Description
In the CCC project, the Institute of Control Engineering
(ICE) contributes the full-by-wire research vehicle MOBILE
[16] as a demonstrator. MOBILE serves as a platform for
research in the fields of E/E-systems and vehicle dynamics.
It features four close-to-wheel electric drives (4x100 kW), as
well as individually steerable wheels, and electro-mechanic
brakes [16]. The vehicle features a FlexRay communication
backbone for inter-ECU-communication and additional CAN
bus interfaces, which are used for communication with vehicle
sensors and actuators. The ECUs responsible for vehicle con-
trol are programmed in a custom-designed MATLAB/Simulink
tool chain. Combined with detailed vehicle dynamics mod-
els, the tool chain serves as a means to establish a rapid-
prototyping process for vehicle control algorithms.
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Fig. 3. hardware architecture for obstacle avoidance use-case
Within the scope of the project, a use case in the form
of automated obstacle avoidance will be implemented in the
experimental vehicle MOBILE. The basis for this use-case is
a trajectory following stability control system. In general, sta-
bility control systems only steer the vehicle into the direction
given by driver input at the steering wheel angle. However, as
the driver does not always perform safe steering maneuvers,
particularly in critical driving situations, such as fast obstacle
avoidance, this extended stability control will follow a safe
pre-planned trajectory instead of following a potentially unsafe
path, steered by the driver.
The research vehicle is equipped with a variety of environ-
ment sensors to perceive the static and the dynamic vehicle
environment. Three lidar scanners, a radar sensor and a camera
monitor the environment around the car. This data will be used
to create a map of the static environment, which provides
the basis for a model-based trajectory planning utilizing all
actuators (particularly all-wheel steering) for maximal maneu-
verability.
A hardware architecture showing the perception system, as
well as a simplified network for vehicle control is depicted in
figure 3. With regard to environment perception, the required
actions will be performed in a distributed system of three
nodes. GPS and inertial data is fed via CAN to a node which
is responsible for vehicle localization and motion estimation.
Lidar sensors and a camera are streamed via UDP to a node
responsible for environment perception (sensor data process-
ing, data fusion, environment modeling). Data from a radar
sensor is aquired via a CAN bus connection.
Trajectory planning will be performed on the ”Vehicle
Control” node, utilizing aggregated data from vehicle and
environment sensors. The planned trajectory is then converted
to reference values for the six vehicle control ECUs (three
main control units, three hot stand-by nodes), which are
connected with the already mentioned FlexRay backbone.
As the research vehicle is not permitted to drive in public
traffic, the use-case will be verified and validated on a closed
testing ground only. However, the sensor setup and sensor data
processing architecture is very similar to the research vehicle
Leonie [17], also built and maintained by the ICE, so that at
o Disabling a hardware (availability) (OR)
 Disabling Camera  
 blinding the camera (SAND)
 placing LED device   
 emitting a strong light to the camera
 Disabling sensor or ECUS (OR)
 transmitting  electromagnetic plus (EMP)
 Crashing the framework of ECU
 Disabling LIDAR (OR)
 Jamming  LIDAR
 Physical damage
 Disabling Radar  
 Jamming attack 
o Confusing the proper function of a component
 Confusing GPS
 Generating fake GPS signal
 Confusing  LIDAR  (OR)
 spoofing signal
 replay attack 
 Relaying the signal attack
 absorbing the signal
 Confusing  Radar  (OR)
 Replaying  signal attack 
 Using undetactable obstecale 
 Confusing Camera (OR)
 Disabling surrounding environment
 Confusing the auto controls
 Manipulating surrounding environment
Fig. 4. general attack tree for the Hardware components in our use-case
least parts of the identified attack vectors could be transferred
to a vehicle with a driving permit for public roads.
B. Threat modeling for the use-case
We used our model to identify the potential threats within
the automated obstacle avoidance use-case. We started our
investigation by defining all components which could include
vulnerabilities, and identify the security requirement that could
be violated in the case of exploiting these vulnerabilities.
Lidar, Camera, Radar, and GPS are possible attack surfaces in
our use-case. We tried to construct attack trees for each one
of them, as shown in figure 4; these trees are derived from
the general ones (i.e., disabling a hardware and confusing the
proper function of a component). Detailed explanation about
attacking the camera and lidar in the vehicle can be found in
[18].
The manipulation of the surrounding infrastructures has
a direct effect on the functionality of different components
in our use-case (such as the Camera). Figure 5 illustrate a
general attack tree for the surrounding environment which
affect our use-case’s components. On the other hand, crashing
the framework of an ECU will lead to preventing the ECU
from doing its function and disable it, even, temporarily.
V. RELATED WORK
Threats analysis of modern vehicles has remained a hot
topic, and will continue. As modern vehicle architecture is get-
ting more complicated, the potential threats are increasing too.
Various researchers have tried to point out the vulnerabilities
within the vehicular system based on different perspectives;
Checkoway et al. [19] looked at potential attack surfaces
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o Manipulating surrounding environment (OR)
 Road-related attacks (OR)
 installing fake signs
 Installing fake speed signs 
 Installing fake announcement signs 
 Placing harmful devices  (e.g. IR LED)
o Disabling surrounding environment (OR)
 Removing road sign 
 Disabling speed sign (OR) 
 Removing the sign
 Distorting the sign
Fig. 5. general attack tree for surrounding infrastructure in our use-case
which could be exploited by attackers externally. On the other
hand, Koscher et al. [3] studied the attack surfaces on the
underlying system structure. They demonstrated that attackers
could leverage the direct access to the CAN bus to control
various functions adversarially. Petit and Shladover, in [20],
investigate the cyberattacks for the automated and connected
vehicle. Attack trees were used as a tool to illustrate the
attack steps for individual attack scenarios within the vehicular
system such as [9]. Aijaz et al. [21] tried to create a reusable
attack tree for the V2V communication threats. In our work,
we tried to provide an abstract model which help to create
general attack tree for the whole vehicular domain.
Many threat model schemes were used to character cyberse-
curity threats in different environments,such as STRIDE [22]
and SDL [23]. However, McCarthy et at. [24] claimed that
these models may not be fully applicable in the automotive
cybersecurity analysis. Therefore, they proposed the use of
threat model which is a hybrid of various models. We went
in the same direction by adopting existing model (i.e. CIA
model) in our approach.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this work, we created a comprehensive threat model
based on the existing vehicle-related threat modeling efforts.
Our model classifies and identifies the threats based on target
assets, the violated security requirements, and the accessibility
of the threats. General attack trees can be linked to each
of the identified threats. We explored the automated obstacle
avoidance use-case while trying to classify the potential threats
against it, based on our model. Future work will define
mitigation mechanisms based on this model.
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